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ROBERT D. SNOOK·· 
INTRODUCTION 
Most environmental laws contain provisions allowing private 
groups or individuals to bring actions against alleged polluters or gov­
ernment agencies for violations of environmental statutes. 1 These 
"citizen suit" provisions have become an important feature of modern 
environmental litigation. As a Senate report stated, "[c]itizen suits are 
a proven enforcement tool. They operate as Congress intended-to 
both spur and supplement ... government enforcement actions. They 
have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance gainS."2 
• This article was a finalist in the 1990 ATLA Environmental Law Contest. 
•• Law Clerk to Justice Alfred V. Covello, Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990-91. 
B.S., 1981, M.S., 1985, University of Massachusetts; J.D., Western New England College 
School of Law, 1990. 
The author acknowledges the kind support and guidance offered by Professor Denis 
Binder throughout the research and writing of this article. 
1. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S. 
Ct. 304 (1989); see Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988); Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 141S(g) (1988); Noise Control Act § 12, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 4911 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); 
Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act 
§ 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300(j)-8 (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520, 
30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1988); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) 
(1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 310, 
42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control LaWs, 
Part II, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. Inst.) 10063 (1984). 
2. S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1985) ("In the past two years, the 
number of citizen suits to enforce [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] per­
1 
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Only two statutory requirements must be met in order to file a citizen 
suit. The first is that before acting, the citizen plaintiff must give sixty 
days' notice to the alleged violator, the federal Environmental Protec­
tion Agency ("EPA"), and any state environmental agencies.3 The 
second is that the suit may be commenced only if the appropriate gov­
ernment agency is not already "diligently pursuing" its own action.4 
In the recent decision of Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,s the 
United States Supreme Court resolved a split in the United States 
Courts of Appeals regarding notice in the context of citizen suits. 
Before Hallstrom, some courts of appeals used a "jurisdictional pre­
requisite" approach and held that sixty days' notice is an absolute re­
quirement of subject matter jurisdiction.6 Other courts have used a 
"pragmatic/functional" approach and concluded that the sixty-day 
notice provision is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, requirement.7 
The two approaches can produce significantly different results. A 
plaintiffs failure to meet a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction 
can be raised at any point in the suit by either party, or even by the 
court sua sponte. This would result in immediate dismissal for lack of 
authority to hear the case.S Conversely, failure to meet a procedural 
requirement is much less serious and often can be cured by simply 
granting a stay of proceedings. 
mits has surged so that such suits now constitute a substantial portion of all enforcement 
actions ... under this Act."); see Comment, Environmental Law--Citizen Suits and Recov­
ery o/Civil Penalties, 36 U. KAN. L. REv. 529, 532 (1988). 
3. Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) ("There are only two 
limitations on the right of the citizen to bring suit. First, the citizen must give sixty days' 
notice to the Administrator, the State and the alleged polluter ...." (citations omitted». 
4. Id. ("Second, a citizen may not bring his or her own action if the 'Administrator 
or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of 
the United States ... .' ") (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(I)(B». 
5. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989). 
6. The '~urisdictional prerequisite" approach was used by the United States Courts 
of Appeals for the First, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Hallstrom v. Tillamook 
County, 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); Garcia v. Cecos 
Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1985); Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 
316 (6th Cir. 1985); City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976). 
7. The "pragmatic" approach was used by the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Second, Third, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits. Hempstead County and Ne­
vada County Project V. EPA, 700 F.2d 459, 461-63 (8th Cir. 1983); Susquehanna Valley 
Alliance V. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 243-44 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Callaway, 524 
F.2d 79, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Train, 510 F.2d 
692, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
8. See, e.g., EPA V. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1188 
(N.D. Ind. 1989) (citing Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. V. Juntunen, 838 F.2d 942, 
944 (7th Cir. 1988», aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Hallstrom has resolved most of 
the controversy by holding that "the notice and 60-day delay require­
ments are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit."9 
The Court, however, stated that they did not reach the issue of 
whether notice is jurisdictional or procedural. lo 
After the Hallstrom decision, failure to meet the sixty-day re­
quirement will result in immediate dismissal in most cases. Thus, the 
Hallstrom decision produces virtually the same results as the jurisdic­
tional prerequisite approach. There are, however, ambiguities in the 
Hallstrom decision that may allow a plaintiff to avoid dismissal in two 
specific circumstances. The first is that in Hallstrom, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed only the timing of notice, not the suf­
ficiency. Some courts have held that a plaintiff may avoid dismissal, 
even when they have not given formal notice, if the defendant had 
notice-in-fact before the SUit. 11 The second circumstance is that if the 
defendant fails to challenge notice in a timely fashion, the court may 
find that the notice requirement has been waived. 
Section I of this article discusses the language and legislative his­
tory of citizen suit provisions in the context of environmental law. 
Section II details the two conflicting interpretations proffered by the 
pragmatic/functional and jurisdictional prerequisite courts and the 
Supreme Court's response in Hallstrom. Section III analyzes the Hall­
strom opinion and concludes that under this approach, while failure to 
give formal notice is generally fatal to an action, in some circum­
stances a plaintiff may avoid dismissal if he or she demonstrates that 
the defendant received notice-in-fact more than sixty days before the 
suit. Section III also concludes that a plaintiff will be unable to avoid 
dismissal by arguing that the defendant has waived the notice 
requirement. 
I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND HISTORY 
A. Statutory Language 
The first citizen suit provision in a modern environmental statute 
was section 304 of the Clean Air Act. 12 In subsequent legislation, 
9. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 311. 
10. Id. 
11. Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1190-91; Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. 
Supp. 1176, 1181 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Sierra Club v.Block, 614 F. Supp. 488 
(D.D.C. 1985); Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984). 
12. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1706 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988». The statute states in relevant part: 
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Congress exhibited a "tendency to literally 'lift' " this section of the 
Clean Air Act and, eventually, it came to be "included in all new fed­
eral environmental statutes or major statutory amendments."13 Sev­
eral courts have recognized that the citizen suit provisions of the 
various environmental laws are essentially identical and have been 
willing to use case law applying to one statute as' precedent in inter­
preting similar language in other laws. 14 
The notice provision of the Clean Water Act is typical of citizen 
suit legislation. The statute states in relevant part: 
No action may be commenced­
(1) ... 
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice 
of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State 
in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged 
violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or 
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the 
United States, or a State to require compliance with the stan­
dard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of 
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of 
right. IS 
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf­
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other 
governmental instrumentality ...) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an 
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the 
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin­
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary 
with the Administrator, or 
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or 
modified major emitting facility without a permit .... 
Id. Prior to enactment of the citizen suit provisions, enforcement of environmental laws 
were the sole responsibility of state and federal governments. Enforcement was secured by 
agencies such as the EPA. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 
No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988». 
13. Miller, Private Enforcement ofFederal Pollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10309, 10311 (1983). 
14. Hallstrom v. TiUamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) ("At least 
eight environmental statutes contain identical or similar notice provisions .... Courts have 
construed these provisions identically despite slight differences in wording." (citations 
omitted», aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 792 (W.D. Okla. 
1989) ("No circuit has addressed the sixty (60) days notice provision of section 9659. How­
ever, it is informative that some circuits have addressed the notice requirements of various 
other environmental statutes."). 
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988). Other statutes differ slightly, reflecting structural 
differences in the laws. 
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By its terms, the statute presents only two prerequisites to citizen 
suits: notice and an absence of government action. 16 The statute does 
not expressly state whether the sixty-day provision is a jurisdictional 
or procedural element. This ambiguity created "a considerable 
amount of litigation and judicial confusion over the consequences of 
the failure by plaintiffs to fully observe the requirement."17 In an ef­
fort to interpret this ambiguity in the language of the statute, courts 
have turned to the legislative history.18 
B. Legislative History of Citizen Suits 
The legislative history of the citizen suit provisions indicates that 
the benefits and disadvantages of private suits were actively debated by 
Congress. Congress viewed citizen suits as an inexpensive alternative 
to government enforcement and included the citizen suit provisions in 
an effort to encourage the EPA to uphold the law. 19 If the EPA failed 
to adequately pursue violators, the provision would allow citizens a 
private right of action to enforce the laws either by proceeding directly 
against the violator or by suing the EPA itself for failure to prosecute. 
Congress was also concerned that the EPA was understaffed and its 
resources overstretched.20 Proponents of the legislation anticipated 
that because private citizens are the parties most directly affected by 
environmental law violations, they would prove to be highly motivated 
and particularly effective advocates, thus augmenting federal enforce­
ment. 21 Balanced against these benefits were Congress' concerns that 
allowing citizens to initiate private suits would cause a flood of litiga­
tion that would block the courts and actually hinder the government's 
regulatory actions. Congress also feared that large numbers of citizen 
suits, lacking the centralized control of a single national agency, would 
result in non-uniform or even haphazard application of environmental 
laws, thereby defeating any attempt to fashion a coherent national en­
vironmental policy.22 Congress expected the citizen suit provisions 
"to both goad the responsible agencies to more vigorous enforce~ent 
of the anti-pollution standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to 
16. Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988). 
17. See Miller, supra note 1, at 10064. 
18. See. e.g., Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891; Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 81 
(1st Crr. 1985). 
19. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
21. See Comment, supra note 2, at 532. 
22. Comment, supra note 2, at 532-33; Note, Citizen Suits and the Clean Water Act: 
The Supreme Coun Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
1988 UTAH L. REv. 891, 894. 
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provide an alternative enforcement mechanism."23 
Another major reason for allowing citizen suits was the realiza­
tion that the existing government agencies had not energetically en­
forced prior environmenta1laws. In support of the legislation, Senator 
Muskie stated that "[s]tate and local governments have not responded 
adequately to [the need for enforcement] .... It is clear that enforce­
ment must be toughened .... More tools are needed, and the Federal 
presence and backup authority must be increased. "24 Proponents of 
the legislation believed that "[g]overnment initiative in seeking en­
forcement under the Clean Air Act ha[d] been restrained. Author­
izing citizens to bring suits for violations . . . [would] motivate 
governmental . . . enforcement and abatement proceedings. "25 
Opponents of the provisions claimed that by insisting on the need 
for an alternative private enforcement mechanism the legislature, in 
effect, suggested that the EPA could not be relied upon to fulfill its 
responsibilities.26 In response, Senator Muskie argued that citizen 
suits provided a valuable source of assistance to government agencies. 
"I think it is too much to presume that, however well staffed or well 
intentioned these enforcement agencies, they will be able to monitor 
the potential violations. "27 
In sum, the legislative history supports the position that Con­
gress' primary objective in enacting the citizen suit provisions was to 
pressure the EPA to greater enforcement action and to supplement the 
agency's resources. As one article noted, citizen suits were designed to 
"expand the scope of enforcement without burdening public funds and 
encourage public authorities to enforce environmentallaws."28 
C. Legislative History of the Notice Provisions 
The citizen suit provisions include a special requirement that 
sixty days' notice be given to the alleged polluters and to the appropri­
ate federal and state government agencies. The notice requirement is a 
critical element of the citizen suit provisions. The sixty-day notice re­
quirement was included within the various environmental statutes for 
entirely different reasons than the citizen suit provisions. The citizen 
23. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir.) (citing S. REP. No. 
1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 35-36 (1970», cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). 
24. 116 CONGo REC. 16,091 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
25. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970); Miller, supra note 1, at 
10064 n.1O. 
26. See Miller, supra note 1, at 10064 n.ll. 
27. 116 CONGo REC. 16,116 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
28. Note, supra note 22, at 894. 
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suit sections as a whole were designed as a liberal grant of power to 
private parties in order to encourage compliance with environmental 
laws. In contrast, the sixty-day notice requirement was viewed as a 
means of limiting private participation in environmental litigation. 
Specifically, the opponents of the citizen suit provisions feared that 
granting wide authority to citizens to institute private actions would 
result in a flood of litigation.29 The opponents also felt that the provi­
sions would hinder the enforcement efforts of the EPA by compelling 
the agency to divert scarce resources to defend itself from large num­
bers of potentially frivolous claims.30 As Senator Hruska remarked, 
"[t]he functioning of the department could be interfered with, and its 
time and resources frittered away by responding to these [citizen 
suits]."31 
Proponents of the citizen suit provisions therefore proposed in­
serting the sixty-day notice requirement as a simple but effective 
means of limiting access to the courts: 
The conditions placed on such suits are intended to assure that 
they will complement, and not interfere with, Federal regulatory 
and enforcement programs. Citizen suits under these amendments 
may only be initiated [sixty] days after the citizen has notified the 
President, the State in which the alleged violation occurred, and the 
alleged violator.32 
In addition to limiting access to the courts, the legislative history 
supports the position that the sixty-day notice requirement was added 
to the citizen suit provisions to encourage EPA enforcement, by pro­
viding a window between notice and filing in which the agency could 
act.33 One authority has suggested that "[t]he notice requirements 
were adopted, in part, to counter those who opposed citizen suit provi­
sions, purportedly fearing that citizens would flood courts with suits 
29. See 116 CONGo REC. 16,115 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska). 
30. [d. 
31. Id. 
32. Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788,793 (W.O. Okla. 1989) (quoting S. REP. No. 51, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, reprinted in 1 SARA: THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 206-30 (Environmental 
Institute For Waste Management Studies) (1987). The legislature intended the limits on 
the award of attorney's fees to act as a restraint on frivolous litigation. See Comment, 
supra note 2, at 534-35. 
33. S. REp. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in Natural Resources De­
fense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Miller, supra note 
1, at 10064 (primary purpose of the notice requirement was "to provide the government a 
last opportunity to perform its enforcement functions before private attorneys general step 
into the breach"). 
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and interfere with the proper enforcement role of the executive 
branch."34 It has also been suggested that the notice requirements 
represent a balancing between the fear of overburdening the EPA and 
the federal courts and the necessity for private enforcement.35 In or­
der to achieve passage of the citizen suit provisions, Congress included 
the notice requirement as a compromise to appease opponents of the 
legislation.36 
Accordingly, it appears that the legislative purpose behind the cit­
izen suit provisions as a whole is very different from the legislative 
purpose underlying the specific sixty-day notice requirement. The pri­
mary objective of citizen suits in general "was to 'encourage citizen 
participation.' "37 Congress did not envision a restrictive role for the 
private plaintiff, but rather "[t]he 'citizen suit' provision was designed 
as an expansive grant of standing to private individuals . . . ."38 In 
contrast, the sixty-day notice requirement was a deliberate attempt by 
some members of Congress to limit the number of potential citizen 
suits and provide a means for government agencies to operate without 
interference from private parties.39 
The conflicting goals of the various members of Congress regard­
ing citizen suits resulted in the sharp dichotomy evident in the legisla­
tive history. Consequently, courts have been able to use the bifurcated 
legislative history to support two contradictory positions: the sixty­
day notice sections are to be read liberally in order to encourage citi­
zen participation in environmental protection or, alternatively, they 
are to be read restrictively, in order to free the EPA from bothersome 
interference. Courts that have held that notice is only procedural in 
nature often cited those sections of the legislative history that apply to 
citizen suits as a whole, thereby suggesting a liberal reading.40 Courts 
that have found notice to be a jurisdictional prerequisite relied upon 
the specific legislative history of the sixty-day notice requirement, 
thereby supporting a more restrictive reading.41 
34. Miller, supra note I, at 10064. 
35. Note, Notice by Citizen Plaintiffi in Environmental Litigation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 
299, 306 (1980). 
36. Miller, supra note I, at 10067. 
37. Proffitt v. Municipal Auth. of Morrisville, 716 F. Supp. 837, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976», aff'd without 
opinion, 897 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1990). 
38. Waste Management of N. Am., Inc. v. Weinberger, 862 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956,959 (9th Cir. 1988». 
39. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985). 
40. See cases cited supra note 7. 
41. See cases cited supra note 6. 
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For example, one court stated that "the citizen suits provision 
reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the 
courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would 
be implemented and enforced. "42 Other courts have examined the 
same legislative history and found that the sixty-day notice require­
ment within the citizen suit arrangement was the result of Congress' 
"inten[t] to give the EPA an opportunity to resolve issues regarding 
the interpretation of complex environmental standards by negotiation, 
unhindered by the threat of an impending ... lawsuit,"43 thereby, 
"reduc[ing] the volume of costly private [environmental] litigation."44 
As a result of a legislative compromise between those favoring 
and those opposing citizen suits, the legislative history demonstrated 
the existence of two different purposes. Predictably, the ambiguous 
language of the statute and the dichotomy of purpose evident in the 
legislative history caused a split in those courts of appeals that at­
tempted to construe the provisions. Section II examines the split in 
the courts of appeals and the Hallstrom court's partial resolution. 
II. DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS: THE PRAGMATIC/ 

FUNCTIONAL ApPROACH, THE JURISDICTIONAL 





A. The Pragmatic/Functional Approach 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, 
Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits adopted a pragmatic/func­
tional approach in addressing the notice requirements of the citizen 
suit provisions.4s These opinions were marked by a distinct unwilling­
ness, on policy grounds, to reject an otherwise meritorious lawsuit 
solely because of a perceived technical failing.46 As one court noted, 
"[a]dherents of this view believe that strict application and enforce­
ment of the notice requirement is contrary to Congress' intent in per­
mitting citizen actions ... [because this] would frustrate citizen 
enforcement of the act, and treat citizens as 'troublemakers' rather 
42. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
43. Walls, 761 F.2d at 317; Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th 
Cir. 1987) ("legislative history reftect[s] Congress's belief that ... citizen enforcement 
through the courts should be secondary to administrative enforcement by the EPA"), aff'd, 
110 S. Ct. 304 (1989). 
44. Walls, 761 F.2d at 317. 
45. See cases cited supra note 7. 
46. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 890-91. 
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than 'welcome participants in the vindication of environmental inter­
ests.' "47 "Pragmatic" courts, therefore, focused on whether the 
agency or violator was aware of the violation, and if so, declined to 
dismiss the action even if less than sixty days' notice was given.48 
One of the earliest examples of the pragmatic approach can be 
seen in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway.49 Cal­
laway, in part, involved a permit question under section 404 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.50 The plaintiff gave notice on 
July 15, 1974, and commenced suit on September 3, 1974.51 "The 
[United States] district court reasoned that the 6O-day waiting period 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and therefore dismissed the 
claim."52 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, citing an 
earlier case in which it had "held that the 60-day notice provision is 
not an absolute bar to earlier suits by private citizens."53 The court 
noted that a "strong additional argument" for allowing jurisdiction in 
Callaway was the fact that the purpose behind the sixty-day require­
ment, providing the EPA time to react, had been fulfilled. 54 In Cal­
laway, the Second Circuit expressly rejected a jurisdictional 
prerequisite model on the grounds that the notice requirement was 
procedural and that the EPA had been given notice and had informed 
the plaintiffs that they did not intend to act. 55 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to 
a similar conclusion in Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Is­
land Nuclear Reactor.56 In Susquehanna, the EPA and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission ("NRC") were given only two days' notice 
before the complaint was filed. 57 The court, however, declined to dis­
miss the suit. Initially, the court noted that the NRC itself "ha[d] 
taken . . . a rather pragmatic approach to the 60-day notice provi­
47. Id. at 891 (citations omitted). 
48. Id. at 890-91. 
49. 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975). 
50. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). 
51. Callaway, 524 F.2d at 83. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 84 n.4. 
55. Id. at 83-84. 
56. 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980). One authority described the Third Circuit as "the 
leading proponent of the irrational formalism school" because the circuit found it "sense­
less and a poor use ofjudicial resources to dismiss a case for failure to adhere to the 6O-day 
notice requirement." Miller, supra note I, at 10065-66. 
57. Susquehanna, 619 F.2d at 243. 
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sion."s8 The court quoted the NRC which had stated that the sixty­
day requirement "is in the nature of a statutorily mandated jurisdic­
tional exhaustion requirement designed to afford an agency an oppor­
tunity to pass upon claims of alleged violations."59 The NRC also 
indicated that while the suit was indeed premature, "dismissal for fail­
ure to observe the 60-day condition . . . would serve no purpose."60 
The NRC noted that the two federal agencies had, in fact, been "given 
an opportunity to respond ... and did so prior to judicial disposition 
of the complaint."61 The court agreed that requiring "dismissal and 
refiling of premature suits would be excessively formalistic."62 Find­
ing that the EPA had actual notice of the alleged violation, the court 
concluded that "[c]ertainly, ... the complaint alleged a claim over 
which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction."63 
In sum, the pragmatic/functional courts "have refused to allow 
'form to triumph over substance' " by declining to dismiss suits for 
failure to meet the sixty-day requirement.64 Almost all attacked the 
jurisdictional prerequisite courts as being excessively formal or "overly 
literal."6s At least one court suggested that it was a waste of judicial 
resources to compel dismissal and refiling after perhaps years of dis­
covery and pre-trial proceedings.66 
Another reason some courts of appeals adopted the pragmatic/ 
functional approach was based upon their interpretation of the legisla­
tive history. In general, these courts relied upon those parts of the 
legislative history that suggested that citizen suits were intended to be 
read liberally as broad grants of power to private individuals to assist 
in enforcing environmental laws. Thus, if the EPA was, in fact, aware 
of the alleged violations and still chose not to act, the purpose of sixty­
day notice requirement was met and dismissal of the complaint would 
not serve any purpose.67 As a result of this view of the legislature's 
intent, pragmatic/functional courts concluded that notice must be 
58. Id. 




63. Id. The court also noted, as had the Callaway court, that the court had in­
dependent jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Id. 
64. Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or 
the Agony ofDefeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 327, 335 (1989). 
65. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 551, 563 
(D. Minn. 1987); see also Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985). 
66. Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for Hygienic Env't v. Eaton, 644 F.2d 995, 996 
(3d Cir. 1981). 
67. Williams, 651 F. Supp. at 563-64. 
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merely a procedural element. Because notice was considered only pro­
cedural in nature, the courts retained the power to hear the case and 
could "cure" the defective notice by, for example, granting a stay for 
sixty days before proceeding with the case. 
While satisfying equitable concerns, the pragmatic/functional ap­
proach was plagued by several weaknesses. The approach appeared to 
violate the strict language of the statute and was contrary to Congress' 
stated desire that the EPA be granted sixty days to act without any 
threat of interference. The approach also ignored congressional intent 
that the notice requirement act as a check upon a potential flood of 
litigation. Based upon these concerns, the jurisdictional prerequisite 
courts found that a plaintiff must comply rigorously with the sixty-day 
notice requirement before a court can have jurisdiction to hear the 
case. 
B. The Jurisdictional Prerequisite Approach 
Before Hallstrom, the United States Courts of Appeals for First, 
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits adopted a position that sixty days' 
notice was an absolute requirement of subject matter jurisdiction68 and 
that failure to give notice would result in dismissal at any point in the 
proceedings.69 Where notice was found to be jurisdictional, courts 
simply had no power to act and, therefore, courts had no leeway to 
grant stays or use other procedural devices to avoid dismissal. The 
primary reason given for adherence to the jurisdictional prerequisite 
approach was that it more closely fit a strict reading of the statutory 
language and the legislative history. As one court noted, "[t]his ap­
proach focuses on the plain language of the statute and the policy con­
cerns underlying the notice requirement."7o 
The language of most sixty-day notice provisions states only that 
"[n]o action may be commenced ... before 60 days after the plaintiff 
has given notice of the violation" to the appropriate parties.?) In Gar­
cia v. Cecos International, Inc., 72 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit adopted the jurisdictional approach concluding 
68. See cases cited supra note 6. 
69. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1188 (N.D. Ind. 
1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990). 
70. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891. 
71. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(I) (1988). 
72. 761 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1985). The Garcia case involved application of the Re­
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). Id. at 
77-78. In Garcia, "the cause of action under RCRA was pleaded by an amended complaint 
filed after removal [to federal district court]. Because of the plaintiffs' failure to grant any 
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that "[t]he plain language of [the section] commands sixty days' notice 
before the commencement of the suit. To accept anything less 'consti­
tutes, in effect, judicial amendment in abrogation of explicit, uncondi­
tional statutory language.' "73 The Garcia court further stated that 
"the notice requirement is not a technical wrinkle or superfluous for­
mality that federal courts may waive at will" and that it was "part of 
the jurisdictional conferral from Congress that cannot be altered by 
the courts. "74 
Other jurisdictional prerequisite courts similarly have based their 
decision to adopt this approach upon an examination of the legislative 
history of the notice requirements, instead of the legislative history of 
citizen suits in general. For example, in Brewer v. Ravan,7S a United 
States district court utilized the jurisdictional approach stating that 
the "primary purpose ... of the ... federal environmental law's notice 
requirements is 'to give the EPA an opportunity to resolve issues . . . 
unhindered by the threat of an impending private lawsuit,' and 
thereby reduce the volume of costly private environmental litiga­
tion."76 Because they focused upon a literal reading of the statute and 
the legislative history of the compromise notice requirement, these 
courts held that even though the requirements for citizen suits gener­
ally are interpreted liberally, the notice element is a "precondition of 
the district court's jurisdiction" and must be met strictly.?7 
In addition, courts that applied the jurisdictional prerequisite 
model have advanced several related arguments. For example, in City 
ofHighland Park v. Train,78 the court noted that "Congress intended 
to provide for citizens' suits in a manner that would be least likely to 
clog already burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger govern­
mental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief."79 As 
a result, the court stated that "Congress's intention would be frus­
trated if the statutory mandate . . . were ignored. "80 
notice to EPA and the defendants of the lawsuit before the filing of [the] action," the court 
found that it had no jurisdiction. Id. at 82. 
73. Id. at 78 (quoting City of Highland Park v. Train, 374 F. Supp. 758, 766 (N.D. 
Ill. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976)). 
74. Id. at 79. 
75. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
76. Id. at 1181 (quoting Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 
1985)). 
17. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S. 
Ct. 304 (1989). 
78. ~19 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cerro denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976). 
79. Id. at 690-91. 
80. Id. at 691. 
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The Train court's statement illustrates another reason for reading 
the notice provisions strictly. If Congress intended to encourage non­
judicial dispute resolution by compelling a sixty-day waiting period, 
then the notice requirement should be construed strictly as an absolute 
bar to jurisdiction to prevent the parties from having access to the 
courts for the full sixty days. This point is illustrated further by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hallstrom v. 
Tillamook County :81 
Non-judicial resolution of such conflicts is more likely if parties 
consider their interests and positions in a nonadversarial setting 
before suit is filed. Litigation should be a last resort only after other 
efforts have failed. We believe that the "jurisdictional prerequisite" 
approach is more consistent with this design than the pragmatic 
approach.82 
The court further stated: 
[J]urisdictional interpretation of [the sixty-day notice provision] 
serves better the underlying policy aims of encouraging non-judicial 
resolution of environmental conflicts .... [O]nce a suit is filed, posi­
tions become hardened, parties incur legal fees, and relations be­
come adverianal so that cooperation and compromise is less likely. 
The pragmatic approach fails to recognize that "a mere adjustment 
of the trial date or the filing of a supplemental or amended com­
plaint to cure defective notice cannot restore a sixty-day nonadver­
sarial period to the parties. "83 
The jurisdictional prerequisite courts have also found practical 
reasons for requiring sixty days' formal notice as a requirement for 
suit. As noted above, these courts argued that strict enforcement of 
the notice requirement would encourage settlement by preventing the 
inevitable hardening of positions that accompanies a lawsuit. 84 Most 
persuasive to the courts of appeals, however, was the argument that 
while Congress intended citizen suits in general to be a generous grant 
of authority for citizen plaintiffs to act, it intended the notice require­
ment to act as a check on excessive private litigation and force a wait­
81. 831 F.2d 889. 
82. Id. at 891-92 (citation omitted). 
83. Id. at 891 (quoting Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 1985». 
Before the Supreme Court decision in Hallstrom, several courts concluded that the jurisdic­
tional prerequisite approach was in line with the then existing Supreme Court precedent. 
See, e.g., Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788, 793 (W.D. Okla. 1989). 
84. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891; Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23,26 (D. 
Vt. 1990). 
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ing period in which the EPA could act unhindered.8s 
C. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County 
In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the split between those courts applying the pragmatic 
approach and those following the jurisdictional model. 86 The Court 
concluded that sixty days' notice is a mandatory precondition to a 
suit.87 The Court declined to decide if notice is a jurisdictional or a 
procedural element. 88 
The plaintiffs in Hallstrom were dairy farmers who lived near a 
sanitary landfill. 89 In April, 1981, the plaintiffs notified local officials 
of their intention to sue Tillamook County for violations of the Re­
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").90 The plaintiffs 
filed suit one year later.91 The defendant moved for summary judg­
ment on March 1, 1983, contending that the plaintiffs had failed to 
send the required notice to the relevant state and federal agencies.92 
On March 2, 1983, the plaintiffs notified these agencies.93 
The district court found that the plaintiffs had cured any defects 
in notice by their belated attempts to inform the state and federal 
agencies.94 The court noted that these agencies had not attempted to 
instigate any action of their own.9S The district court concluded that 
dismissal would be a waste of judicial resources and, therefore, denied 
the defendant's motion.96 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the pragmatic approach of the district court 
and held that notice is an absolute requirement for jurisdiction.97 Sim­
ilar to other jurisdictional prerequisite courts, the majority focused on 
the "plain language of the statute" and a strict interpretation of the 
"policy concerns underlying the notice requirement. "98 
85. See supra note 83. 
86. 1I0 S. Ct. 304 (1989). 
87. Id. at 311. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 307. 





95. Id. at 308. 
96. 'Id. 
97. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 1I0 S. 
Ct. 304 (1989). 
98. Id. Agreeing with the decision in Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78 (1st 
Cir. 1985), the court of appeals focused on the policy promoting a nonadversarialresolu­
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In the Supreme Court decision, Justice O'Connor, writing for the 
majority, identified the issue as "whether compliance with the 60-day 
notice provision is a mandatory precondition to suit or can be disre­
garded by the District Court at its discretion."99 The opinion began 
by noting that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan­
guage of the statute itself."loo After quoting RCRA's citizen suit pro­
vision, the majority stated that "[t]he language of this provision could 
not be clearer. Citizens may not commence actions ... until 60 days 
after the citizen has notified [the appropriate parties]."101 The Court 
concluded that this language "acts as a specific limitation on a citizen's 
right to bring suit. [Therefore], [u]nder a literal reading of the statute, 
compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory, not op­
tional, condition precedent for SUit."102 
The plaintiffs argued, as had the pragmatic/functional courts, 
that the language should be construed flexibly and that "a 60-day stay 
would serve the same function as delaying commencement of the suit" 
because it would give the EPA time to act if it so desired. 103 The 
majority replied that whether or not a stay is functionally the 
equivalent of a delay in commencement, "such an interpretation . . . 
flatly contradicts the language of the statute."I04 
The plaintiffs next claimed that the sixty-day requirement should 
be subject to "equitable modification and cure"I05 based on reasoning 
found in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines. 106 The Court disagreed, saying 
the logic in Zipes was based upon a different statute which had a no­
tion of the underlying conflict. Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 891. For a discussion of Garcia, see 
supra text accompanying notes 72-74. The court noted that the sixty-day period was in­
tended to allow the parties a window free of litigation in which cooperation would be more 
likely. Id. The court also stated that the liberal notice standard of the pragmatic approach 
would "render [the notice] provisions worthless." Id. 
99. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 307. 
100. Id. at 308 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980». 
101. Id. at 308. 
102. Id. at 309. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. The majority also noted that Congress had created exceptions to the notice 
requirement in some RCRA provisions and that if Congress had intended, they could have 
created such exceptions here. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). In Zipes, a union brought a sex discrimination suit 
against an airline under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 388. Some mem­
bers of.the class had not filed on time. The court of appeals held that notice was a jurisdic­
tional prerequisite to suit. Id. at 389. The Supreme Court reversed and held that notice 
was subject to equitable defenses such as waiver. Id. at 393. 
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tice section that was, in reality, a statute of limitations.107 The Court 
found that the sixty-day requirement in the context of existing envi­
ronmental statutes does not function as a statute of limitations. 
"Rather, petitioners have full control over the timing of their suit: 
they need only give notice to the appropriate parties and refrain from 
commencing their action for at least 60 days. The equities do not 
weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements when the proce­
dural default is caused by [the] petitioner[] ...."108 
The plaintiffs, using an argument that had been raised by several 
pragmatic/functional courts, claimed that a strict interpretation of the 
sixty-day requirement was contrary to congressional intent. lOO The 
majority countered this argument in two ways. It first noted that in 
circumstances in which the language of a statute is clear, the text is 
conclusive and the legislative history need not be consulted.110 The 
Court then reasoned that, even if the legislative history was consid­
ered, it "indicate[ d] an intent to strike a balance between encouraging 
citizen enforcement of environmental regulations and avoiding bur­
dening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits." III 
The majority observed that a strict interpretation of the notice require­
ment would therefore fulfill congressional intent in one of two ways. 
It would allow the agencies to act against the violator without hinder­
ance or, alternatively, it would allow a violator needed time to correct 
the offending activity.ll2 Either approach would satisfy the broader 
objectives of Congress by eliminating the need for a suit altogether. ll3 
The plaintiffs countered that sixty days' notice merely would al­
low violators an additional sixty days to continue polluting and 
thereby exacerbate the environmental harm which the statute was in­
tended to prevent. 114 The majority acknowledged the possibility of 
this result, but held that "this problem arises as a result of the balance 
107. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 309. 
108. Id The plaintiffs also argued that it is inappropriate to use an overly technical 
interpretation of statutory provisions in the context of citizen suits because the plaintiffs are 
often laypersons. Id. The Court countered that in this case suit was filed by an attorney, 
not a layperson. Id. at 310. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. The Court further stated that Congress could have created exceptions to the 
general notice requirement. The Court noted that Congress had previously done this with 
regard to other RCRA sections, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(I)(A). See Dague v. City 
of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 25 (D. Vt. 1990). 
111. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310 (citing 110 CONGo REc. 32,927 (1970)(statement of 
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struck by Congress in developing the citizen suit provisions."lIS 
The plaintiffs also claimed that if the agencies expressed no inter­
est in filing their own suits, then the forced sixty-day wait was point­
less. 1l6 Justice O'Connor responded that "such a result may be 
frustrating to the plaintiff" but that the argument "ignores the possi­
bility that a violator or agency may change its mind."l17 Justice 
O'Connor then concluded, "[w]e hold that where a party suing under 
the citizen suit provisions ... fails to meet the notice and 6O-day delay 
requirements ... the District Court must dismiss the action as barred 
by the terms of the statute."1l8 
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented, and claimed that the 
majority's decision unjustifiably frustrated congressional purpose in 
creating citizen suits. 1l9 In addition, the dissent argued that it was a 
waste of judicial resources to dismiss the action after a trial on the 
merits.120 Finally, the dissent sought to limit the reach of the major­
ity's holding by suggesting that the Hallstrom decision did not address 
the question of whether notice could be waived. 
Justice Marshall argued that the statutory language is not as clear 
as the majority suggested. He acknowledged that "[t]here can be no 
doubt that the statute requires notice before a plaintiff can file a com­
plaint,"121 but noted that the statute did not define "any particular 
sanction for noncompliance"122 and that "violation of a mandatory 
precondition to suit does not necessarily require dismissal of the 
suit."123 
The dissent then turned to a similar notice section in the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act124 and found that while the Court 
previously had concluded that notice in the context of that statute was 
also a mandatory precondition to suit, "[it had] nevertheless held that, 
rather than dismissing the suit, the court should hold it in abeyance 
for 60 days after the commencement of state proceedings, after which 
115. Id. at 311. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76,82 (lst Cir. 1985». 
118. Id. at 312. 
119. Id. at 312-15 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 312. 
122. Id. at 313. 
123. Id. 
124. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 14(b), 81 Stat. 602, 607 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 633(b) (1988». 
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time the grievant could continue his federal suit."12s 
Addressing the policies and legislative history behind citizen suits 
in the context of environmental law and citing to the majority opinion, 
the dissent identified two policy objectives that Congress intended to 
be satisfied by the citizen suit provisions. The first objective was to 
encourage federal agency compliance with the law, and the second was 
to give violators an opportunity to stop the alleged violations. 126 Cit­
ing directly to the statutory history, the dissent found that "one of 
Congress' purposes in enacting the citizen suit provision, of which the 
notice requirement is a part, was to encourage citizen suitS."127 Turn­
ing again to the majority opinion, the dissent said that "[t]he Court's 
own analysis in this case makes clear that the purposes of the notice 
requirement would be served equally well by a court order staying pro­
ceedings for 60 days as by dismissal."128 The dissent concluded: 
Where Congress intends to facilitate citizen suits, and where the 
salutary purposes of the notice provision can be equally well served 
by a stay as by dismissal, a regime that requires the dismissal of a 
citizen suit that has "consumed the time and energy of a District 
Court and the parties for nearly four years," and that has resulted 
in a judicial determination ... is simply inconsistent with the will of 
Congress. 129 
In a footnote to the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall sought to 
limit the extent of the majority opinion and suggested a defense to 
dismissal, stating: 
As there is no dispute in this case that respondents timely raised the 
claim that petitioner had not complied with the notice provision, 
the question whether a defendant may waive the notice requirement 
is not before the Court, and any "resolution" of the question is nec­
essarily dictum. In any event, I do not understand the Court to 
express any view on whether the notice requirement is waivable.130 
The Hallstrom decision, while not deciding the technical question 
of whether notice is procedural or jurisdictional, settled the issue as a 
practical matter by holding that failure to meet the requirement will 
result in mandatory dismissal. In so doing, the Supreme Court set a 
125. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 313 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Oscar 
Meyer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1979». 
126. Id. at 314 (citing the majority opinion). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. (quoting the majority opinion). 
130. Id. at 313 n. *. 
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firm rule that will serve to guide lower courts addressing this issue in 
most cases. Questions remain, however, regarding the exact limits of 
the Hallstrom decision and the strategies available for plaintiffs who 
have failed to give formal notice. 
III. AFTERMATH OF HALLSTROM 
In the majority of cases following Hallstrom, failure to give sixty 
days' notice will be fatal to a private suit. It is also clear that in Hall­
strom, the Supreme Court explicitly did not determine "whether the 
'mandatory conditions precedent' were also 'jurisdictional in the strict 
sense of the term' "131 or what form of notice would be sufficient. It is 
important to note, however, that in Hallstrom, the Supreme Court ap­
peared to tacitly support the jurisdictional model. The majority 
adopted the view of the statutory history prevalent in the jurisdictional 
prerequisite courts, namely, that the notice requirement was a political 
compromise designed to allow the enforcement agencies time to act 
unhindered by threat of private actions and, at the same time, to act as 
a check upon a potential landslide of citizen suits. 132 Furthermore, 
many of the plaintiff's arguments in Hallstrom were essentially the 
same as those raised by the pragmatic/functional courts and the ma­
jority's opinion expressly rejected each one. For example, pragmatic/ 
functional courts have argued that notice requirements should be con­
strued flexibly to encourage citizen suits. These courts have also ar­
gued that it would be a waste of judicial resources to dismiss a suit for 
purely technical reasons. 133 The majority opinion specifically ad­
dressed and repudiated both these arguments. Thus, while the 
Supreme Court did not issue a definitive ruling on the theoretical na­
ture of notice requirements, it resolved the issue as a practical matter 
by making notice mandatory. The Court, therefore, accepted the ma­
jor underlying premise of the jurisdictional prerequisite courts and re­
jected the main arguments of the pragmatic/functional courts. 
In contrast to the majority, the dissent adopted many of the posi­
tions taken by the plaintiff and the pragmatic/functional courts. The 
dissent based one argument on the need for judicial efficiency and a 
second argument on the broad policies underlying citizen suits in gen­
131. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 905 F.2d 1568, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Hallstrom, 
110 S. Ct. at 311). 
132. See supra text accompanying note 115; see. e.g.• EPA v. Environmental Waste 
Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1190 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
133. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text. 
21 1991] CITIZEN SUITS AFI'ER HALLSTROM 
eral. I34 With regard to the latter argument, the dissent overtly ac­
cepted the position, characteristic of those courts of appeals that held 
notice to be a procedural issue, that Congress' primary purpose was to 
encourage citizen suitS.13S Similarly to the pragmatic/functional 
courts, the dissent argued that those sections of the statutory history 
that advocate an expansive role for citizen suits apply equally well to 
interpretations of the notice provisions in' particular. 136 The majority, 
like the jurisdictional prerequisite courts, based interpretation of the 
notice sections upon the more limited aspects of the statutory history 
that applied directly to the notice requirements and that suggested 
that these elements were designed to restrict citizen participation in 
environmental actions.137 
The majority opinion is closer to the literal language of the statute 
and its corresponding legislative history. On its face, the statute does 
require a full sixty days' notice before suit. In addition, while inter­
preting the statutory language, it is more reasonable to address those 
parts of the legislative history that directly apply to these specific sec­
tions than to address that part of the legislative history underlying the 
citizen suit provisions as a whole. Therefore, because the statutory 
history supplementing the notice requirements suggests that they were 
designed to afford the EPA time to act unhindered and to control the 
potential flood of private suits, it seems that the majority opinion is 
aligned more closely with congressional intent. 
However, the effect of the majority opinion on citizen suits cannot 
be ignored. After Hallstrom, a defendant may argue that any defect in 
notice, perhaps even a trivial one, requires the district court to dismiss 
the case immediately.138 This can be especially harsh after a full trial 
on the merits has begun. Furthermore, these suits may be brought by 
private individuals lacking significant resources, often against corpora­
tions or government agencies with vast resources. In these circum­
stances, dismissal after the plaintiffs have incurred significant costs, 
and after years of effort, will appear especially unjust. 
Yet, the harsh application of Hallstrom may be avoided. As one 
court has noted, timing of notice is not the same as sufficiency of no­
tice.139 In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court addressed only the question 
134. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 313 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 314. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 310. 
138. But see infra notes 143-211 and accompanying text. 
139. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1190 (N.D. 
Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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of when notice must be given, not what constitutes notice. l40 There­
fore, the possibility remains for plaintiffs to argue that, while they may 
have failed to give formal notice within sixty days, they have satisfied 
congressional purpose by providing the defendant with sufficient infor­
mation to constitute notice-in-(act more than sixty days before suit. 141 
In addition, as noted by the Hallstrom dissent, the Court did not de­
cide whether notice can be waived. 142 Therefore, it is possible that a 
plaintiff may avoid dismissal if the defendant fails to challenge notice 
in a timely fashion. 
A. Waiver 
Before Hallstrom, the jurisdictional prerequisite courts had held 
that notice is a requirement of subject matter jurisdiction. 143 A plain­
tiff could not claim, therefore, that a defendant had waived notice be­
cause the issue was a question of the power of the court to hear the 
case. However, if notice is not a jurisdictional requirement, then the 
defendant's failure to give notice may be waived if the defect is not 
challenged in a timely fashion. l44 
In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court did not decide whether notice is 
jurisdictional or procedural. The dissent emphasized this fact and 
stated that any discussion of the subject was, at best, dictum. 14s Since 
the Supreme Court did not eliminate the possibility that notice is a 
procedural element, there remains a limited opportunity for a plaintiff 
to argue that the defendant has waived its rights to challenge notice by 
failing to do so in a timely manner. A plaintiff could bolster his or her 
argument by noting that the interests of judicial economy would not 
be served by dismissal after a trial on the merits has begun. 
While this argument remains a possibility for a plaintiff, it has 
certain weaknesses. In Hal/strom, the majority opinion could be inter­
preted as offering tacit support for the jurisdictional model. In declin­
140. See Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Vt. 1990) ("Hal/strom 
is ... distinguished by the fact that it involved the lack of notice altogether, while the 
defendant here attacks the sufficiency of the letter which admittedly was provided."). 
141. For example, a plaintiff may fail to give precise formal notice but may be able to 
argue that informal letters or other correspondence should have put the defendant on no­
tice that suit was imminent. 
142. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304,313 n.· (1989) (Marshall, J., 
Brennan, J., dissenting). 
143. See cases cited supra note 6. 
144. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1188 (N.D. 
Ind. 1989) ("If the notice issue is not jurisdictional, [the defendant] has waived it by failing 
to raise it in a timely manner."), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990). 
145. Hal/strom, 110 S. Ct. at 313 n.· (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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ing to decide the issue, the Hallstrom majority stated that it was not 
necessary to hold that notice "is jurisdictional in the strict sense of the 
term."146 The majority further cited Fair Assessment in Real Estate 
Association v. McNary,147 in which Justice Brennan concluded that a 
statutory administrative exhaustion requirement was a "mandatory 
precondition to suit and was in that sense a 'jurisdictional prerequi­
site.' "148 Fair Assessment involved a suit for damages based upon 
"the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax sys­
tem."149 The petitioner argued that the suit should not be dismissed 
merely because they had failed to exhaust their administrative reme­
dies, as required by state statute. ISO In Fair Assessment, Justice Bren­
nan, while not deciding if the exhaustion requirement was a formal 
element of jurisdiction, concluded that it was functionally a jurisdic­
tional prerequisite and that failure to meet the statutory requirement 
mandated dismissal. lSI Thus, even though the Supreme Court in 
Hallstrom declined to state explicitly that notice was jurisdictional in a 
strict sense, by citing Fair Assessment, the Court's opinion could be 
interpreted as indicating an inclination to treat notice as if it were ju­
risdictional, at least for the purposes of dismissing a suit. As a conse­
quence, if called upon to do so, lower federal courts are likely to 
consider the sixty-day notice requirement as functionally jurisdictional 
and therefore not subject to waiver. ls2 
B. Notice-In-Fact 
A more effective argument than waiver is notice-in-fact. Whereas 
146. Id. at 311. 
147. 454 U.S. 100, 137 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
148. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 311 (quoting Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 137 (Bren­
nan, J., concurring in judgment». 
149. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 101. 
150. Id. at 133. 
151. Id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). In Fair Assessment, Justice 
Brennan was careful never to state that the statutory element in question was to be treated 
as if it were an element of jurisdiction in all circumstances. Furthermore, he stated that it 
was in a sense jurisdictional only after a detailed consideration of the underlying policies. 
Id. at 136-38. 
152. Any attempt to use a judicial efficiency argument to support a waiver defense 
will likely fail. In Hallstrom, the Supreme Court demonstrated an unwillingness to allow 
concerns about judicial efficiency to overcome the literal meaning of the statute. The Court 
suggested that the interests of judicial economy could be served best by establishing a firm 
and certain rule that all suits filed without proper notice would be dismissed. Hallstrom, 
110 S. Ct. at 311-12. In addition, waiver is an equitable defense and, as can be seen from 
Justice O'Connor's treatment ofthe Zipes case, arguments in equity will likely be unpersua­
sive. For Justice O'Connor's treatment of Zipes, see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying 
text. 
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waiver assumes that notice is procedural, an assumption that is partic­
ularly unlikely after Hallstrom, notice-in-fact is a doctrine that oper­
ates independently of whether notice is jurisdictional or procedural. 
In fact, the doctrine has been most often used by those courts that 
assume that notice is an absolute prerequisite of jurisdiction and is 
therefore in no way undermined by the Hallstrom decision. Use of 
the doctrine of notice-in-fact in these circumstances has found some 
support in the academic literature. ls3 In addition, one court has dis­
tinguished Hallstrom on the basis that Hallstrom applies to circum­
stances where there was no notice and not to cases in which the 
sufficiency of notice is at issue. ls4 
Before Hallstrom, some courts following the jurisdictional prereq­
uisite approach avoided dismissing cases if they were able to find no­
tice-in-fact, even if the plaintiff failed to give formal notice sixty days 
in advance of suit. ISS These courts reasoned that concerns about the 
sufficiency of notice raise different questions than concerns about the 
timing of notice. ls6 As a result, it was not inconsistent for a court to 
decide that notice should be read narrowly as an absolute prerequisite 
to jurisdiction, but, at the same time, to hold that notice may be found 
in a number of ways.IS7 Therefore, even if a plaintiff neglected to give 
formal written notice sixty days before commencing suit, the court 
might be able to assert jurisdiction on the basis of informal documents 
or other written warning. Courts that use this approach often accept 
the restrictive view of congressional intent proffered by the jurisdic­
tional prerequisite courts, namely, that Congress intended the sixty­
day limit to act as a means of affording the EPA a period of time to act 
against violators without being hindered by a private suit. The courts 
reasoned that Congress' purpose is fulfilled if the EPA had notice-in­
fact, and thus opportunity to act, regardless of whether notice was 
formal or not. This approach offers courts a flexible method of finding 
notice and, therefore, retaining jurisdiction over the case. 1S8 
153. See, e.g., Note, supra note 35, at 312-14. 
154. Dague v. City of Burlington, 733 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Vt. 1990). 
155. EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1190-91 (N.D. 
Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 
(M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1985); Kitlut­
sisti v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 832 (D. Alaska 1984). 
156. See, e.g., Environmental Waste Control, 710 F. Supp. at 1190. 
157. Id. 
158. One court has expressly rejected the notice-in-fact doctrine. Roe v. Wert, 706 
F. Supp. 788,794 (W.O. Okla. 1989) ("This Court rejects the Roes' argument that notice­
in-fact saves jurisdiction."). 
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In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power CO.,IS9 a pre­
Hallstrom decision, the plaintiff sent letters to the appropriate parties 
more than sixty days before SUit. l60 These letters explained that the 
plaintiffs intended, "after the expiration of the sixty day notice period, 
... to file suit against Consumers Power Company under [the] Clean 
Water Act."161 The court noted that, while the plaintiff had notified 
the parties more than sixty days before filing, the plaintiff "implicitly 
acknowledge[d] that it may not have complied fully with the regula­
tions" governing notice. 162 These regulations state, in part: 
Notice regarding an alleged violation ... shall include sufficient 
information to permit the recipient to identify the specific standard, 
limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity al­
leged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for 
the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date 
or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone 
number of the person giving notice. 163 
The court stated "that although it could have been more specific, 
the notice satisfied regulatory requirements" and held that the "plain­
tiff gave timely and substantially complete, if not complete, notice to 
the appropriate persons."I64 The court expressly found that the plain­
tiff's letters gave sufficient information to allow the defendant and the 
EPA to identify the law violated, the activity in question, the persons 
responsible, and the dates of the alleged violations as required by the 
regulations. Therefore, even though both the court and the plaintiff 
acknowledged that notice was in some ways deficient, the court found 
that it was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. Because the 
court was willing to construe the regulatory requirements liberally, 
and find, in effect, substantial compliance with the agency's regula­
tions, the court was able to avoid dismissing the case. 16S 
Other courts similarly have found jurisdiction even though the 
plaintiffs did not file formal notice in precise compliance with EPA 
regulations. For example, in Brewer v. Ravan,166 defendant Emhart 
Industries, Inc., argued that the plaintiff's notice was "substantively 
159. 657 F. Supp. 989 (W.o. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). 
160. Id. at 998. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (1990). 
164. National Wildlife Fed'n, 657 F. Supp. at 998. 
165. See Williams Pipe Line Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minn., 651 F. Supp. 551, 
564 (D. Minn. 1987) ("There is nothing in the statute or regulation to suggest that the 
required notice must detail the nature of each alleged violation."). 
166. 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988). 
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deficient."167 The court concluded that notice was a jurisdictional pre­
requisite and acknowledged that "the notice provided by plaintiffs ar­
guably was deficient in some respects" but "adequately served the 
intended purpose of RCRA's notice requirement" because it defined 
the law violated, the locations of the violations, the names of the par­
ties giving notice and gave "a generic description of the activity al­
leged to constitute the violation."168 The Brewer court, therefore, 
intentionally "avoid[ed] hindrance of citizen suits through excessive 
formalism" by refusing to dismiss a suit that failed to meet strict regu­
latory standards by finding existing notice substantially complete. 169 
The court in EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc. ,170 also 
found notice-in-fact. In Environmental Waste Control ("EWC"), a cit­
izen group called Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. ("STOP") in­
tervened in a suit between the EPA and EWC, the alleged polluter. l7l 
The citizen group claimed that the regular notice requirements for citi­
zen suits did not apply to intervenors.172 While acknowledging that 
this is normally true, the court rejected the argument because the citi­
zen group's "role in this case ... ha[d] exceeded that of a mere inter­
venor."173 As a result, the EPA moved for dismissal because STOP 
failed to give the state environmental agency formal statutory notice 
sixty days prior to suit. The court concluded, however, that the re­
quired parties had received constructive notice of the alleged violation 
more than sixty days before suit and, therefore, the objectives of the 
notice provision had been met. 174 
The court stated that Congress had intended the notice require­
ment to act as a means of controlling the potential flood of citizen 
suits.175 The court then reviewed the cases in both the jurisdictional 
prerequisite and· pragmatic/functional circuits. and concluded that 
"[a]s to the sufficiency of the notice, the reported cases consistently 
have found that sufficient notice was given if the requisite parties had 
167. Id. at 1181. In Brewer, the plaintiffs were attempting to sue the EPA and two 
corporate defendants for various federal environmental law violations. Id. at 1178. 
168. Id. at 1181. 
169. Id. (quoting Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 1985». 
170. 710 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989), off'd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990). 
171. Id. at 1188. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 1190-91. 
175. Id. at 1189-90. The view generaIly taken by the jurisdictional prerequisite 
courts as opposed to the position taken by the pragmatic/functional courts is that Congress 
intended the notice requirements to be read libera11y in order to encourage active citizen 
participation. 
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'notice-in-fact' of the alleged violations."176 Addressing the facts of 
the case, the court stated: 
To suggest that the state agency did not have notice-in-fact of 
STOP's claims would be to ignore the record STOP has presented. 
Much of STOP's case consisted of observations and reports by state 
inspectors and correspondence between the state agency and Ewe 
concerning violations such as STOP alleges; the state agency even 
considered intervening in the EPA's suit .... Indeed, as is discussed 
in sections that follow, EWe argues that the state agency had ad~ 
dressed or was addressing the very allegations STOP raises here. 
Indiana, although not served with STOP's proposed intervenor's 
complaint, had notice-in-fact of the violations STOP asserts.177 
Environmental Waste Control is an important case because it 
demonstrates that at least one court has been willing to find that a 
defendant was put on notice, not based upon the correspondence sent 
by the plaintiff, but upon the basis of the company's own internal re­
ports and its correspondence with other defendants. In this case, the 
alleged notice was not contained in anyone report but was inferred by 
the court from a series of documents. 
The doctrine of notice-in-fact can operate to mitigate the harsh 
effects of the strict application of the sixty-day notice limit advanced in 
Hallstrom. The doctrine allows a plaintiff to argue that letters, or 
other forms of informal correspondence, constitute adequate notice. 
Courts may be especially open to this argument if there is evidence, 
perhaps from internal memos or otherwise, that the violator was 
aware of the nature and extent of the alleged violations. In fact, notice 
can even be given, not through the acts of the plaintiff, but through the 
acts of third parties. 
In Fishel v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 178 the defendant argued 
that the plaintiffs' notice lacked information regarding the regulations 
involved, the persons responsible and the alleged dates of the viola­
tions.179 The court acknowledged that the notice given was "arguably 
deficient" but refused to dismiss the case because state and federal en­
vironmental agencies had been conducting investigations of the de­
176. Id. at 1190. 
177. Id. at 1191. 
178. 617 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Pa. 1985). In Fishel, the plaintiffs were neighbors of 
the defendant's manufacturing facility and waste disposal sites. Id. at 1533. The complaint 
alleged various environmental law violations "in connection with the disposal of . . . 
wastes." Id. 
179. Id. at 1536. 
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fendant for some time. ISO The court, expressing its belief that the 
purpose of notice had been fulfilled, found that the defendant's knowl­
edge of the agency's actions constituted a form of notice-in-fact and, in 
effect, cured the technical defects in the plaintiffs' notice. lSI 
Notice-in-fact has certain obvious advantages as an argument for 
a plaintiff. Waiver, as an argument in equity, is often a difficult de­
fense to make. This is particularly true following Hallstrom because 
Hallstrom at least suggests that notice is a jurisdictional element and 
therefore cannot be waived. In order to argue waiver, the defendant 
must neglect to challenge a plaintiffs failure to give notice. In the 
aftermath of Hallstrom, this is likely to be a rare occurrence because 
defendants will move quickly for summary judgment if notice is un­
timely. Notice-in-fact, however, is based upon a set of factual circum­
stances that are more likely to occur. To argue notice-in-fact, a 
plaintiff need only show that it has sent the defendant some form of 
notice through an exchange of letters or other correspondence. 
As demonstrated in cases such as Fishel and Environmental 
Waste Control, courts sometimes will allow plaintiffs to cure otherwise 
deficient notice by showing that a defendant had constructive notice 
by virtue of being independently aware of the necessary facts that the 
plaintiff failed to include in the formal notice. A defendant can obtain 
this independent knowledge by being cognizant of an ongoing EPA 
investigation or through the defendant's own investigatory actions. 
This is particularly important for plaintiffs in the context of environ­
mental litigation. For instance, some environmental laws, such as the 
Clean Air Act, permit the EPA to require businesses to engage in a 
measure of self-reporting. ls2 Pursuant to this statute, the EPA admin­
istrator can compel a company to keep certain records or to maintain 
monitoring equipment on site. IS3 The statute also provides that these 
reports be open for public inspection. ls4 These records therefore pro­
vide an important source of information for the purposes of demon­
strating constructive notice on the part of defendants. In addition, 
because of the potential liability under environmental laws such as the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil­
ity Act,ISS companies may have arranged for the preparation of rou­
tine in-house environmental reports in an effort to identify possible 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1). (2) (1988). 
183. Id. 
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988). 
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
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compliance problems. Outside consultants may also be utilized to au­
dit a company in order to determine if violations exist. If these and 
other reports are not prepared in the context of impending litigation, 
they may be available to plaintiffs through the relevant rules of discov­
ery and therefore constitute a potentially important source of informa­
tion about the extent of the defendant's knowledge. 
Finally, especially in the case of large companies suspected of vio­
lations, the EPA and state agencies conduct their own onsite investiga­
tions which can be used to demonstrate that the EPA or the 
defendant, if they were aware of the EPA's activity, had constructive 
notice of the alleged violations. 
Even informal communications between the plaintiff and defend­
ant can potentially be considered "notice" for the purposes of the citi­
zen suit provisions. Notice may be implied if these communications 
contain evidence of an intent to sue and if the defendant is aware of 
any compliance problems either through self-reporting or through in­
vestigations by state or federal environmental organizations. 
The doctrine of notice-in-fact does not violate the Supreme 
Court's holding in Hallstrom. Hallstrom addressed omy the question 
of when notice had to be given, not the contents, quality or method of 
giving notice. In fact, Hallstrom indirectly offers some support to 
plaintiffs using the notice-in-fact argument. Hallstrom overtly 
adopted the view used by the "jurisdictional" circuits, that the sixty­
day notice requirement was designed to control the flood of private 
suits and give the EPA time to act unhindered by citizen suits. 186 If 
the purpose of Congress was to give the EPA or the violator knowl­
edge of an impending suit so that they could act to correct the situa­
tion without interference, and if a defendant has in fact been notified, 
even if not in a specific format or even necessarily by the plaintiff, then 
the plaintiff can argue that the congressional purpose has been fulfilled 
and dismissal would serve no purpose. 
There must, however, be a limit. If notice is defined too infor­
mally, then the purposes of the notice provision will not be met. It 
would be inconsistent to adopt the strict interpretation model of Hall­
strom out of a desire to give full force to the words and intent of Con­
gress and then to define notice so broadly as to eviscerate the notice 
requirement. Some courts have, in fact, put limits on how far they will 
extend the definition of notice. In Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 187 
the plaintiffs alleged that the EPA was aware of the violations com­
186. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 310. 
187. 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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plained of and therefore had constructive notice more than sixty days 
before suit. 188 In contrast to the decisions in Environmental Waste 
Control and Fishel, the Walls court rejected this argument. 189 In 
Walls, the court claimed that the purpose of Congress in enacting the 
sixty-da}' notice requirement was to give the EPA time to act un­
hindered by private suits. 190 The court required that the plaintiff "dis­
tinctly and affirmatively" give full and specific notice and found 
further that the defendant's mere awareness that violations existed was 
insufficient. 191 
In Reeger v. Mill Service, Inc., 192 the plaintiffs complained of the 
operation of a nearby hazardous waste treatment plant.193 The de­
fendant moved to dismiss, arguing it had not received statutory notice. 
The plaintiffs acknowledged that they had failed to give strict formal 
notice but argued that they had warned the EPA verbally and that this 
was sufficient to meet the underlying purpose of the notice provi­
sion. 194 In a brief decision, the court found that the oral notice was 
insufficient and concluded that the unambiguous language of the stat­
ute mandated dismissal when formal notice is not given. 19S 
Other courts also have been strict in determining whether ade­
quate notice has been given. For example, in McClellan Ecological 
Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,196 the plaintiff, a citizen organization 
called McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation ("MESS"), gave sixty 
days' notice to the appropriate parties, including the defendant Secre­
tary of Defense. 197 However, the plaintiff organization "did not pro­
vide notice of its intent to sue with respect to effluent limitations and 
receiving water standards for total suspended matter, suspended 
solids, lead, temperature, turbidity, chlorine, and total cyanide."198 
The citizen group contended that it had "'substantially complied' 
with the notice provisions because it gave sixty days notice of many of 




192. 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.O. Pa. 1984). 
193. Id. at 361. 
194. Id. at 362. 
195. Id. 
196. 707 F. Supp. 1182 (E.O. Cal. 1988). 
197. Id. at 1185. MESS membership consisted of citizens living near McClellan Air 
Force Base in Sacramento, California. Id. In addition to alleged state law violations, the 
complaint alleged violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901-6987, and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. Id. 
198. Id. at 1202. 
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the violations alleged in its complaint."199 
The McClellan court found that notice is a jurisdictional require­
ment and that "the will of Congress expressed in the notice provisions 
[should] be particularly strictly enforced where the Federal govern­
ment is the defendant in a citizen suit."2°O The court therefore 
concluded: 
MESS's complete failure to make any reference at all to alleged vio­
lations regarding total suspended matter, suspended solids, lead, 
temperature, turbidity, chlorine, and total cyanide simply cannot 
satisfy the requirement that a notice of intent to sue include suffi­
cient information to permit the recipient to identify "the specific 
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the ac­
tivity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons respon­
sible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation 
[and] the date or dates of such violation."201 
The court accordingly dismissed the suit for failure to meet the statu­
tory standards for notice.202 
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Mazur­
kiewicz,203 the court also dismissed a complaint for failure to give pre­
cise notice. In Mazurkiewicz, the plaintiff citizen group alleged that 
notice was given to the defendant in a letter sent to a prison official.204 
The notice was allegedly contained in the following address portion of 
the letter: 




Bellefonte, PA 16823 

RE: Federal Clean Water Act 

Sixty (60) Day Notice 

of Intent to Sue 

Attention: David Lapender 

Dear Mr. Lapender:20s 

The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, stating that to sat­
isfy the underlying rational of the sixty-day notice provision: 
it is necessary that an alleged violator be made aware not only of the 
199. Id. at 1203 n.ll. 
200. Id. at 1203. 
201. Id. at 1203 n.ll (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a». 
202. Id. 
203. 712 F. Supp. 1184 (M.D. Pa. 1989). In Mazurkiewicz, a citizen's environmental 
protection group brought suit against a prison. Id. at 1186. 
204. Id. at 1191. 
205. Id. This is not the complete text of the letter. 
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alleged violation (about which he may already know) but also that 
someone else is aware of the alleged violation and that legal action is 
being contempl~ted against the alleged violator. Ifthe alleged viola­
tor does not receive such notice, there is much less incentive for him 
or her to comply voluntarily with the federal law which he or she is 
alleged to be violating. 206 
The court concluded that the inside address of the letter did not con­
stitute proper notice. 207 
Cases like McClellan and Mazurkiewicz demonstrate that the lim­
its of the doctrine of notice-in-fact remain uncertain. Even among 
those courts of appeals that construe the notice requirement strictly, 
there is a significant range of opinion as to what forms of informal 
notice will be accepted. However, while the total number of cases in­
voking the doctrine of notice-in-fact are few, certain tentative conclu­
sions can be made. The first is that oral notice alone is insufficient. 
This is consistent with the purpose of giving notice in that the agency 
or violator should receive an unambiguous warning. Furthermore, the 
substance of an oral conversation is difficult to prove in court. It is 
unclear, however, if oral notice evidenced by some form of written 
confirmation would be adequate. For example, it is conceivable that 
notice could be found when oral notice is referred to in a subsequent 
communication or when written notice, insufficient in some respect, 
was clarified in subsequent oral conversations. 
In addition, some courts are willing to find notice-in-fact if it is 
shown that the violator or agency was aware of the alleged activity.208 
For example, if the EPA had been investigating a company for some 
time, or if internal company memos demonstrate an awareness of an 
illegal activity, some courts have been more willing to find adequate 
notice even from nonspecific letters between the plaintiff and defend­
ant or from internal reports or correspondence between defendants.209 
It does not seem necessary that notice be given in only one document 
or at one specific time. Notice may be found from a series of corre­
spondence or other documents exchanged over a period oftime.210 In­
ternal reports or agency investigations are particularly useful in 
completing otherwise defective notice. Specifically, it might be diffi­
cult for a court to find adequate notice based solely upon an internal 
environmental audit. One of the functions of citizen suit notice is to 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text. 
210. Id. 
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alert the wrongdoer, not just that a violation has occurred, but that 
someone intends to sue. Internal reports could be very useful in cur­
ing notice that is deficient because, while the report mentions that a 
plaintiff intends to sue, it fails to meet the precise requirements of the 
EPA regulations concerning the specific laws violated and the exact 
activities involved. In these circumstances a court might find it disin­
genuous at best for a defendant to claim that a private letter informing 
them that they were to be sued for polluting a river is insufficient no­
tice when the defendant possesses numerous internal memoranda 
specifying the exact nature and extent of their violations. 
Courts using the doctrine of notice-in-fact generally look for the 
key elements of notice: whether the defendant has been notified of the 
nature of the violations, the law alleged to be violated and the intent of 
a party to sue. As early as 1980, one author suggested that courts 
should be willing to find notice simply if there is evidence of notice and 
intent to sue more than sixty days before filing.211 The case law since 
1980 demonstrates that courts do not require all the elements of notice 
to be satisfied from only one document and that even in(ormal letters 
can be sufficient evidence of notice. In addition, some courts have 
been receptive to arguments of notice-in-fact if the defendants were 
independently aware of the violations. Courts have also been liberal in 
applying the notice-in-fact doctrine if the plaintiff did attempt to give 
proper notice, but failed to be sufficiently precise. 
Notice-in-fact offers plaintiffs an opportunity to avoid dismissal 
where the underlying purpose of the notice requirement was met but 
the plaintiff failed to give notice in the formal or usual fashion. The 
notice-in-fact doctrine has been applied inconsistently which renders 
precise analysis difficult. Undoubtedly, it is best for citizen plaintiffs 
to avoid the problem entirely by giving clear notice more than sixty 
days before filing suit. If for some reason clear notice is not given in a 
timely fashion, the plaintiff may pursue the doctrine of notice-in-fact. 
The incomplete and occasionally confusing nature of the existing pre­
cedent regarding notice-in-fact make predictions as to how the courts 
will apply this doctrine difficult. It is possible that courts may find 
jurisdiction based on notice-in-fact, if there is clear evidence of written 
warnings of the potential for a suit, of the nature of the violation, and 
of the laws allegedly broken. These warnings need not always come 
211. An early article on the subject of citizen suits suggested that in deciding ques­
tions of actual notice courts should look at three factors: 1) whether the parties with the 
ability to "remedy the violation" received notice; 2) whether the notice indicated an intent 
to sue; and 3) whether the notice came sixty days before actual suit as measured backwards 
from the filing of the complaint. See Note, supra note 35, at 313-15. 
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from the plaintiff and need not be in any given form. In addition, a 
court may be more willing to find notice-in-fact if the agency or viola­
tor was aware of the precise nature and extent of the activity alleged to 
have been violative. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The Hallstrom decision has gone a long way toward resolving the 
question of the consequences of failing to give a full sixty days' notice. 
Certainly, in most cases, the result will be immediate dismissal. Two 
ambiguous areas remain which allow a plaintiff to argue that dismissal 
would be inappropriate. First, if the defendant neglected to challenge 
notice in a timely fashion, the plaintiff should argue that the defendant 
has waived this issue. The second, and perhaps stronger argument, is 
that if any informal documents, reports or letters were exchanged, the 
plaintiff should argue that the defendant had notice-in-fact, especially 
if there is evidence that the defendant was independently aware of the 
nature and extent of the violations. 
In most circumstances, the Hallstrom decision requires that a 
plaintiff who fails to give sixty days' formal notice will face dismissal. 
However, courts should be willing to examine a plaintiff's claim that 
notice-in-fact was given and, in this regard, should consider the 
following: 
1. Does the record reveal evidence that the plaintiff gave some 
form of notice, even if deficient, sixty days before suit? 
2. Was this notice in writing, in the form of a letter or some 
other correspondence? Did the writing indicate that suit was immi­
nent and provide a rough outline of the alleged violations? 
3. Can the record of the deficient notice be augmented by any 
evidence of oral conversations between the plaintiff and the defendant? 
4. Does the record reveal evidence that the defendant was inde­
pendently aware of the nature of the violations, either from the actions 
of the EPA or by internal company reports? Furthermore, was the 
defendant aware that these were the violations alleged by the plaintiff? 
Courts should then balance the factors listed above against the 
policies underlying the sixty-day notice requirement. If the court finds 
that, under the specific circumstances of the case, notice was sufficient 
to satisfy the policies of giving adequate notice to the parties and en­
couraging citizen participation, the courts may find that dismissal is 
unnecessary . 
